Corruption, institutional setting and FDI: does the use of distinct proxies matter? by Guimarães, Luís Miguel Faria de Castro
Faculdade de Economia, Universidade do Porto 
Master in Economics and International Management 
 
 
 
Corruption, institutional setting and FDI: does the use 
of distinct proxies matter? 
 
 
 
 
Luis Guimarães 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Junho, 2011 
Supervisor: Aurora A.C. Teixeira
 i 
Acknowledgements  
In first place, I would like to thank, to my supervisor Prof. Dr. Aurora Teixeira, to 
whom I am deeply grateful. Thanks for your continuous encouragement, support and 
patience. Thank you for your precious and invaluable contribution, wise critics and 
advice. It was an honour to count on your guidance. Without it, this work would not be 
possible. Your professionalism and dedication are an example that will try to follow. 
Thanks to Prof. Dr. Óscar Afonso, for his helpful comments on my thesis proposal. 
Thanks to all my colleagues of the master in Economics and International Management, 
for your friendship and sharing of experiences. 
Thanks to all teachers of the master in Economics and International Management, for 
your generous knowledge sharing. 
Thank you to the Faculdade de Economia do Porto, namely to its Director Prof. Dr João 
Proença, for providing all the necessary means to develop my work. Also many thanks 
to all the staff of FEP for making the school such a friendly place. 
The last but not the least, my deepest acknowledgement goes to my family. To my wife 
Elisabete and my children Lourenço and Marta, thank you very much for your support, 
belief, and for the time that I was not with you. 
Thank you all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 ii 
Abstract  
Foreign direct investment (FDI) has a critical role, especially in the developing 
economies. The role and the impact of institutional quality, in general, and corruption, 
in particular, on FDI inflows has been reasonably studied by several authors, with the 
most common conclusion being that corruption impacts significantly and negatively on 
FDI. In this work, we review the relevant literature on FDI determinants, highlighting 
the issue of corruption and institutional quality. Most of the existing studies test 
corruption and institutional quality in isolation and, in the majority of cases use a single 
proxy for corruption and institutional quality. It is acknowledged, however, that the use 
of distinct proxies might result on distinct coefficients of the estimates (both in 
magnitude and statistical significance).  
Given that corruption and institutional quality can be proxied by a myriad of different 
indicators (Corruption Perception Index, Bribery Index, Risk Index, to name but a few), 
this dissertation‟s main goals are twofold: 1) to assess the extent to which the use of 
distinct corruption proxies provides different evidence regarding the relation between 
this latter variable and FDI; and 2) to assess the extent to which the use of a given proxy 
for corruption, controlling for other indicators of institutional quality, reveals the usual 
negative relation between corruption and FDI.  
In order to accomplish these goals we resort to the estimation of multivariate 
econometric models using a broad sample of over a hundred countries in the period 
2000-2010.  
Results convey that the use of distinct proxies for corruption does yield to distinct 
results on the impact of this latter variable on countries‟ FDI flows, with Bribery index 
emerging statistically significant related to FDI whereas Corruption Perception Index 
(CPI) and Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) not. Moreover, in contrast of using 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in isolation, when we control for other indicators of 
institutional quality (e.g., Human Development Index, Economic Freedom Index, 
Business Freedom Index, Ease Doing Business), that corruption proxy becomes 
statistically significant. 
Keywords: Foreign direct investment (FDI); Corruption; Institutional Quality; Proxies 
JEL-Codes: F21; F23; K42 
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Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) plays a key role, in the global economy in general, and 
in the economic development of the recipient countries in particular (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2001; Blonigen, 2005). The FDI inflows, measured by indicators such as 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), development rates, balance of payments, etc., 
contributes positively and in a crucial way to economic performance, especially in the 
less developed countries (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). 
The literature traditionally refers to several factors, namely market size and dynamics, 
human capital, innovation capabilities, economic stability, and the quality of institutions 
(incl. corruption) (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Blonigan,2005; Wu, 2006; Faeth, 2009) 
as important determinants of FDI inflows. Studies on FDI that includes corruption 
and/or countries‟ institutional „quality‟ are relatively scarce albeit being on growing.  
Although in a general way, the authors agree that high indexes of corruption (low 
institutional quality) would increase risk and economic uncertainty and, therefore, 
decrease FDI inflows (e.g., Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Bitzenis et al., 2009; 
Uhlenbruck et al., 2006), it is important to underline that findings in these studies are 
not consensual regarding the impact of corruption on FDI. For instance, recent studies 
that link FDI with corruption which focus on BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) 
or some other focusing less developed countries, such as Thailand, Argentina, or 
Poland, demonstrate that although corruption in these countries are relatively high, they 
are still attracting huge amounts of FDI (Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Blonigen, 2005; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008). Moreover, although sparse, there are some empirical research 
that fails to encounter a statistical significant relation between corruption and FDI. 
Specifically, Wheeler and Mody (1992) failed to find a significant correlation between 
risk and foreign investment by US firms. In the same line, Hines (1995) (in Cuervo-
Cazurra 2008), found that, with the exception of the FDI that comes from the US, 
corruption in the host country does not appear to affect the growth of inward FDI. 
Indeed, this author found that high-growth corrupt countries had higher levels of growth 
of inward FDI than other countries.  
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Although the sampling might explain, in part, such awkward results,
1
 we argue that it is 
relevant to assess whether the use of distinct indicators of corruption influence the 
results regarding the relation between FDI and corruption. Additionally, we conjecture 
that the control for other indicators of institutional quality (such Human Development 
Index; Economic Freedom Index; International Country Risk Guide indicator; Business 
International Index) might potentially influence the relation between FDI and 
corruption. 
In order to measure corruption and countries‟ institutional quality, authors have used a 
myriad of indicators. For instance, Uhlenbruck et al. (2006) (cited in Cuervo-Cazurra, 
2008), measure corruption using the variable country‟s risk factor, which includes host 
country corruption (which ranges from 0, low, to 10, high corruption), country 
pervasive corruption and arbitrary corruption.
2
 Using a broader indicator, which 
underline the institutional quality of a country, Drabek and Payne (2001) tested the 
effect of non-transparency on foreign investors using a non-transparency index which 
includes, beside corruption, other indicators of institutional quality, such as unstable 
economic policies, weak and poorly enforced property rights, and inefficient 
government institutions that increase the risk and uncertainty associated with business.  
Most studies use indexes that aggregate both corruption indicators and institutional 
quality (Drabek and Payne, 2001; Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Blonigen, 2005; Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2008). There is a possibility that when analyzed as a separate variable, but 
used simultaneously in the same regression, the outcome might be different from the 
existing studies‟ result. In the present work, we will try to do precisely that, analyzing 
the two dimensions, corruption and institutional quality, as separate variables, and in the 
case of corruption, testing for distinct proxies (controlling and not controlling for the 
impact of the institutional quality variable).  
Thus, it is critical in the present study to assess to what extent the use of distinct 
indicators for corruption and/or institutional quality provokes divergent impacts of 
                                                 
1 The existence and attractiveness of natural resources might explain the failure to find out the significant 
and negative relation between FDI and corruption indexes. 
2 Cuervo-Cazurra (2008) distinguishes two types of corruption, pervasive corruption – corruption that is 
certain and widespread –, and arbitrary corruption – corruption that is uncertain. The first one is a 
deterrent for FDI, because it creates an additional but known cost that could even act as grease in 
facilitating transitions, while in the second case, arbitrary corruption has a negative effect because it 
creates higher uncertainty in the investment.  
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corruption on FDI inflows. In order to properly assess such issue, we use the set of 127 
countries to estimate an econometric, multivariate, model that, controlling for other 
relevant variables that are likely to affect FDI inflows (e.g., GDP, industrial structure, 
FDI attractiveness programs, education, labor markets, etc.), link corruption and 
institutional quality to FDI inflows, using several distinct indicators or proxies for 
corruption (both controlling and not controlling for the effect of other institutional 
quality indicators). This would permit to better rationalize (potential) non consensual 
results regarding the impact of corruption and institutional quality on FDI influxes.  
This sample of 127 countries is an adequate group to consider at this level given that it 
is composed of quite distinct countries regarding both the institutional setting, namely in 
what regards the perceptions of corruption or Corruption Perception Index (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2001; Transparency International, 2009), and FDI performance.  
The present dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter 1 we review the relevant 
literature on the issue in analysis. Then, in Chapter 2 we detail the methodological 
considerations, and in Chapter 3, we present the empirical results of the work. In 
Conclusions, we summarized the main outcomes of the present study and highlight its 
limitation and paths for future research. 
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Chapter 1.  Corruption, institutional setting and FDI. A review of the 
literature 
1.1.  Initial considerations 
In this chapter, we analyse the several existing theories about FDI and its main 
determinants that explain the degree of attractiveness of the recipient countries. Then, 
we analyse some corruption and institutional quality definitions and their possible 
proxies, as well as their measurement units. Finally, we analyse what the empirical 
evidence tell us about the impact of corruption and institutional quality on FDI. 
1.2.  Determinants of FDI 
According to the IMF (1993: 86, in Bitzenis et al., 2009) “direct investment is the 
category of international investment that reflects the objective of a resident entity in one 
economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another economy ... The 
lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the direct 
investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence by the investor on the 
management of the enterprise. Direct investment comprises not only the initial 
transaction establishing the relationship between the investor and the enterprise but also 
all subsequent transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both 
incorporated and unincorporated.” 
In 1999, OECD classifies and determines that, to be considered as FDI, the minimum 
equity stake for an investment should be 10%. Still in 1993, the IMF stipulates that the 
FDI should include equity capital, reinvested earnings and other capital, what could turn 
difficult to compare the indicators of different countries. According to Bitzenis (2006), 
the most important characteristics of FDI are the acquisition or the operation of taking 
the ownership or control of a foreign company or asset. Nevertheless, the practices in 
defining FDI vary greatly across the different countries, as well as the management 
requirements of companies. The understanding of economic globalization phenomenon, 
forces to look carefully to the MNEs FDI influxes (Blonigen, 2005; Bitzenis et al., 
2009). In addition, it is possible to catalogue the theoretical models that define FDI in 
micro and macroeconomic models. The first one, the microeconomic model, focus on 
motivations of the company to invest abroad, and even to became a MNE himself, such 
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as growing needs, and search for markets. The macroeconomic model focuses on the 
level of FDI flows and aspects such as the exchange rates and taxes on trade (Blonigen, 
2005; Bitzenis, 2006; Faeth, 2009). 
Most of the early studies on FDI determinants (e.g., Robinson, 1961; Behrman, 1962; 
Basi, 1966; Kolde, 1968; Wilkins, 1970; Forsyth, 1972, cited in Faeth, 2009), looked to 
a variety of factors, such as trade barriers, costs factors and investment incentives and 
opportunities. All these studies agree that factors such as market size, growing need and 
market share, classified as marketing factors, are key determinants of FDI. Moreover, 
the availability of labor and labor costs, production costs and raw materials availability 
are also relevant for FDI attraction. According to Basi (1966) (cited in Faeth, 2009), 
political stability, foreign exchange stability, and receptivity to foreign investment were 
the most important determinants of FDI. 
In the early theoretical models, and according to the neoclassical trade theory of 
Heckscher-Ohlin, the FDI was seen as a part of the international capital trade (Subasat, 
2003). This model was based on the equilibrated framework of two countries (home and 
foreign), two production factors (capital and labor) and two goods. Assuming perfectly 
competitive goods and factor markets, and identical constant returns, also the 
MacDougall–Kemp model – based on theoretical models by Hobson (1914), Jasay 
(1960), MacDougall (1960) and Kemp (1964) (cited in Faeth 2009) - advocate that 
capital was expected to move to the country with higher capital returns (i.e. the capital-
scarce country). However, there was the possibility to manipulate these capital 
movements, imposing taxes on international capital mobility. This neoclassical model, 
that explains international capital trade due to differences in returns on capital, has a 
problem of consistency, due to its assumption of perfect competition, which is deeply 
improbably to verify (Santis and Vicarelli, 2000). 
Davidson (1980), using survey data of US MNEs, showed that FDI by countries such as 
Canada, the UK and Australia was positively affected by host country characteristics, 
namely, market size and geographical proximity, cultural similarity and firms‟ level of 
experience. Other studies (e.g., Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Bitzenis et al., 2005; 
Blonigen, 2005; Faeth, 2009) showed that market size, market growth and trade barriers 
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could potentially be important determinants of FDI, so they should be incorporated into 
the theoretical models about FDI (Drabek and Payne, 2009). 
In the MNE theory, the FDI had been based on the OLI advantages, that is, Ownership 
(O), the Location (L), and the Internalization advantages (I). The Eclectic paradigm or 
OLI framework of Dunning, explains the option of the MNE‟s for FDI with the 
conjugation of these three advantages (Sanctis and Vicarelli, 2001; Faeth 2009). With 
this OLI framework (Dunning, 1977, in Tallman, 2004) aimed at explaining and 
synthesizing the reasons for firms to operate internationally (advantages) and the mode 
of entry (FDI, export and licensing). The framework permits not only to determine the 
mode of entry of a MNE in a foreign country, but also the volumes of FDI inflows 
(Blonigen, 2005; Bitzenis et al., 2009). Markusen, (1998), combines ownership and 
location advantages with technology and country characteristics, and explains both 
horizontal and vertical FDI,
3
 developing another model of analysis, which is the 
knowledge-capital model, and it is applied for the two types of FDI.  
According to Santis and Vicarelli (2000), and in alignment with what is said before, 
when trying to find FDI determinants common to several European countries (Italy, 
France, Germany, UK, Netherlands), the results reveal a positive relation between FDI 
inflows and the ratio of per capita GDP of both countries, the investor and respective 
host. It is also visible that the flows among the countries vary according to market 
seeking motives, and that political and social stability (together with a government that 
regulates the market but do not interfere), fiscal policy and statutory corporate tax rates, 
R&D, human capital, technological innovation are very important FDI attraction 
determinants. 
According to the effect of natural resources as determinant of FDI attraction, that 
relation is so strong as the need of the investing companies in explore that particular 
resource, once a given resource is unique and specific of a particular place, the 
companies will invest in that market (Hill, 2007) 
Referring specifically to the main obstacles to FDI, Bitzenis et al. (2009) argue that 
those include several items, namely corruption and other institutional quality indicators 
                                                 
3 Vertical FDI takes place when the multinational fragments the production process internationally, 
locating each stage of production in the country where it can be done at the least cost. Horizontal FDI 
occurs when the multinational undertakes the same production activities in multiple countries (Markusen, 
1998). 
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(e.g., bureaucracy, the tax system, the labor market structure, the legal framework, the 
lack of infrastructures and technological development, the macroeconomic instability, 
and the political violence).  
Corruption and other variables reflecting poor institutional quality have been associated 
to many developing countries, and have a direct negative impact in FDI influxes due to 
the image of social instability, inequality, and bad use of the public moneys and 
malfunctioning of institutions (Kaufman et all, 2005). Economies that are viewed or are 
associated with high levels of corruption usually have greater economic and social 
instability, low public investment in education and health care, and by consequence, 
poor economic development (Myint, 2000; Jain, 2001; Tanzi, 2002).  
Summarizing, cf. Table 1, the major FDI determinants, can be grouped into four main 
factors: Market, Social, Political and Institutional Quality (which includes Corruption). 
Table 1: Key determinants of FDI according to the OLI framework 
Determinants Variables 
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GDP + 
Geografic location + 
Acessebilitiy + 
Natural resources + 
Social 
Education/literacy + 
R&D + 
Labor costs - 
Labor laws flexibility + 
Quality work force + 
Politics 
Incentives to IDE attraction + 
Taxes - 
Currency (exchange rates) +/- 
Political situation + 
Institutional 
Quality 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception Index (TI) 
[the higher the CPI the higher the 
level of transparency] 
+ 
Bribe Payer‟s Index [the higher the 
BPI the lower the propensity for 
bribes] 
+ 
Global Corruption Barometer - 
Other 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicators 
Human Development Index + 
Economic Freedom Index + 
International Country Risk Guide 
indicator 
+ 
Business International Index + 
Overall, we can say that for dimensions Market, Social and Politics, the impact and 
variation of FDI inflows is positive. In other words, as determinants of FDI, when these 
variables have high values and a positive direction, the effect of attraction of FDI 
increases. For instance, a large market, good accessibilities, high level of literacy, and 
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better quality workforce, increases the capacity of a country to attract FDI. On the other 
hand, a weak institutional quality, which includes high levels of corruption, 
bureaucracy, risk and low levels of human development, economic freedom or business 
development, have a negative impact on FDI. 
1.3.  Corruption and institutional quality: definitions and measurement 
As referred earlier, institutional quality aggregates several indicators, some of which 
have illegal character, namely corruption and bribery, and others that are not illegal, 
such as bureaucracy and inefficiency of institutions (Drabek and Payne, 2001), with 
both of them having a key role in the attractiveness of the country regarding FDI 
(Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Drabek, and Payne, 2001; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Bitzenis et 
al., 2009; Demirbag et al., 2010). 
Another term frequently used in order to address institutional quality is “non-
transparency” (Wheeler and Moody, 1992; Sanyal and Samantha, 2008). This term 
includes not only economic policies, but also a set of practices, usually, governmental 
and institutional that are not corruption but increase the risk and uncertainty, 
contributing negatively to the country attractiveness, and consequently has a negative 
impact on FDI inflows (Baughn et al., 2010). These practices include, for instance, 
weak laws on property rights, inefficiency of the courts, and judiciary and bureaucracy 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; Javorcik, 2009; Baughn et al., 2010). 
Also an important aspect of non-transparency arises in the property rights and the lack 
of copyright protection, and in the existence of patent security and lack of enforcement 
of contracts. This is a critical issue to the companies that are investing large amount of 
money in R&D and new patents (Drabek and Payne, 2001). Another two aspects of 
non-transparency, that can impose severe barriers to business, and specifically to FDI, 
are the level of bureaucratic inefficiency within the government, and the poor 
enforcement of the law. At last, the conduct of economic policies per se, and the 
predictability of the policies and government behavior are also determinant, in the way 
that they are indicators of how legal institutions work (Drabek and Payne, 2001). 
Focusing now on a particular dimension of institutional quality, corruption, the World 
Bank defines it based on the issue of abuse of public power for private benefits (Tanzi, 
1998, in Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). In the same line, corruption has been defined by 
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other authors (Busse et al., 1996, cited in Habib and Zurawicki, 2001) as the use of 
power by governments and similar or close institutional entities, to profit or obtain 
benefits in their own profit. Stressing the illegal and improper behaviors, Warren and 
Laufer (2010) refer that corruption is an act of improbity (cf. Table 2).  
Table 2: Definitions of corruption 
Definition Studies 
The abuse of public power for private benefits Tanzi (1998) 
The use of power by governments and institutional entities, to obtain 
benefits in their own profit 
Busse et al. (1996) 
The act of improbity, which includes illegal and improper behaviors Warren and Laufer (2010) 
The abuse of entrusted power for private gain 
Transparency International Facilitation payments, where a bribe is paid to receive preferential 
treatment for something that the bribe receiver is required to do by law 
In general, corruption includes bribery, bureaucracy, and inefficiency, involving both to 
the public and private sectors (Baughn et al., 2010). It is documented (Wu, 2006; 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2008; Baughn et al., 2010) that the huge growth of international trade 
over the past five decades has been accompanied by an increase in bribery. The World 
Bank estimated that 5% of the exports to developing countries go to corrupt officials 
(Moss, 1997, cited in Sanyal and Samantha, 2008). By definition, bribery is an illicit 
and secret payment, somewhere along the business process (Drabek and Payne, 2001). 
According to OECD Observer (2000, cited in Sanyal and Samantha, 2008: 125), bribery 
is defined as “the offering, promising or giving something in order to influence a public 
official in the execution of his/her official duties” and it could take the form of money 
or any other pecuniary or non pecuniary benefits or advantages.  
The most common indicators used to measure corruption (cf. Table 3) are: the 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Bribe Payer‟s Index, and the Global Corruption 
Barometer (GCB), all of them managed by Transparency International. The CPI reports 
the perceived level of corruption in 146 countries. The classification ranges between 10, 
which represents a „very clean‟ country, to 0, which reflects a highly corrupt country. 
The Bribe Payer‟s Index assesses the supply side of corruption and ranks corruption by 
source country and industry sector. It also uses the scale 0 to 10, where 10 is very low 
propensity to pay bribes and 0 is very high propensity to pay bribes. Finally, the GCB is 
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the only worldwide public opinion survey on views and experiences of corruption that 
assesses the general public‟s perception and experience of corruption in more than 60 
countries. It differs from Corruption Perception Index, because the CPI assesses 
experts‟ perceptions of levels of public sector corruption across countries, while the 
Global Corruption Barometer is concerned with attitudes toward and experiences of 
corruption among the general public. It inquires the people to tell in what measure 
they perceive corruption in public institutions, in a scale from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 
5 (extremely corrupt).  
Table 3: Proxies for corruption and institutional quality 
 Proxy Name Scale 
Corruption 
CPI Corruption Perception Index (TI) 
Best: 10 Worse: 0  
BPI Bribe Payer‟s Index 
GCB Global Corruption Barometer (GCB) Best: 1 Worse: 5 
Institutional 
Quality IQ) 
HDI Human Development Index Best: 1 Worse: 0 
EFI Economic Freedom Index Best: 100 Worse: 0 
ICRG 
International Country Risk Guide 
indicator 
Low risk: 100 High risk: 0 
BII Business International Index Best: 100 Worse: 0 
Corruption + 
IQ 
CRF Country Risk Factors Barometer  
NT Non Transparency Best: 10 Worse: 0 
Several recent studies (Drabek and Payne, 2001; Busse and Groizard, 2008; Andreula et 
al., 2009) have emphasized the importance Institutional Quality as one of the most 
important means to attract FDI. The Institutional Quality is defined in several different 
ways, and not necessarily including corruption. Institutional Quality is based in an 
institutional framework, composed by three basic institutions, which are private 
property rights, the law of contract and a strong government (Kostevc, Redek and 
Sušjan 2007). 
Other authors define Institutional Quality as one set of practices and characteristics of 
the legal environment of the countries such as weak laws on property rights, 
inefficiency of the courts, and judiciary and bureaucracy (Habib and Zurawicki, 2002; 
Javorcik, 2009; Baughn et al., 2010), and lack of copyright protection and in the 
existence of patent security and lack of enforcement of contracts (Drabek and Payne, 
2001). It could also be characterized by the relationship between institutions and 
transparency (Andreula et al., 2009). Knack and Keefer (1995) use two measures of 
institutional quality, which represent the security of property rights and contract rights, 
namely, risk of expropriation and the rule of law. They use the International Country 
 11 
Risk Guide (ICRG) as the source for these two proxies. Also Busse and Groizard 
(2008), refer to Institutional Quality, and suggest that governments have, in the first 
place, to improve the regulatory quality in the home country before the benefit from 
openness to foreign capital (i.e. in the form of FDI) can be derived. They utilize the data 
provided by Doing Business namely concerned to issues such as starting a business, 
labor market regulations, contract regulations, creditor rights and insolvency 
regulations. 
In relation to Institutional Quality (other than not corruption-related factors), the most 
well known indicators are: the Human Development Index (HDI), Economic Freedom 
Index (EFI), International Country Risk Guide indicator (ICRG) and Business 
International Index (BII) (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Wei, 2000; Drabek and Payne, 
2001; Bitzenis et al., 2009; Demirbag et al., 2010). 
The Human Development Index is a summary measure of human development that is 
published by the United Nations, which measures the average achievements in a country 
in three basic dimensions of human development: expectancy at birth; adult literacy 
rate; GDP per capita. It ranges between 1 (high development) to 0 (very low 
development). 
The Economic Freedom Index (EFI) measures ten components of economic freedom 
(business; trade; fiscal; government spending; monetary; investment; financial; property 
rights; corruption; labor), assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 
100 represents the maximum freedom.  
The International Country Risk Guide (ICRG)
4
 composite indicator provides annual 
averages of political, financial and economic risk indicators for 140 countries in a scale 
of 0 to 100, where 100 represents the lowest risk.  
Finally, the Business International Index is provided by the Economist Intelligence 
Unit, an independent entity that provides important economic and business research, 
                                                 
4
 Composite indicator of: Political Factors: Government Stability; Socioeconomic Conditions; 
Investment Profile; Internal Conflict; External Conflict; Corruption; Military in Politics; Religious 
Tensions; Law and Order; Ethnic Tensions; Democratic Accountability; Bureaucracy Quality; Economic 
Factors: GDP Per Capita; Real Annual GDP Growth as Annual % Change; Annual Inflation Rate as 
Annual % Change; Budget Balance as % of GDP; Current Account as % of GDP; Economic Factors: 
GDP Per Capita; Real Annual GDP Growth as Annual % Change; Annual Inflation Rate as Annual % 
Change; Budget Balance as % of GDP; Current Account as % of GDP) 
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forecasting and analysis, over 180 countries, comparing and ranking key indicators such 
as GDP growth, inflation, exchange rates and balance of payments. Values range 
between 0 (worst) and 100 (best).  
It is important to refer that there are some composite indicators which includes, 
simultaneously, corruption and other institutional quality indicators. In concrete, we 
might point the Country Risk Factor (CRF) and Non Transparency. The former includes 
corruption and twelve other indicators (Wheeler and Moody, 1992),
5
 whereas the latter 
(the Non Transparency), includes corruption, political instability, inefficient public 
institutions, and poor property rights (Drabek and Payne, 2001). 
1.4.  The impact of corruption and institutional quality on FDI. What does the 
empirical evidence tell us?  
There are several authors and empirical studies that address the theme of corruption 
relating it with FDI influxes and MNEs location decisions (e.g., Habib and Zurawicki, 
2001; Blonigen, 2005; Bitzenis et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006).  
Corporate boardrooms and the popular business press suggested that corruption has a 
negative effect on the investment in foreign countries (Wu, 2006). According to Habib 
and Zurawicki (2001), the negative effect of corruption on investments is clear; at the 
same time, political stability and economy openness have positive effects on the FDI 
influxes.  
Corruption usually affects negatively the influxes of FDI because the companies and the 
home land headquarters, find it increasingly difficult to perform business, working as an 
„arbitrary tax‟ (Tanzi, 1998, in Habib and Zurawicki, 2001). Wei (2000), instead, finds a 
consistently negative relation between corruption and FDI, using both the Business 
International index and the Transparency Index (although still negative, results were 
smaller for TI index). 
However, some studies show a different perspective. For instance, Kaufmann (1997) 
and Wei (2000) (cited in Habib and Zurawicki, 2001) evidence that, from a firm 
perspective, sometimes bribery can compensate on large business deals.  
                                                 
5 Namely, attitude of opposition groups towards FDI; government support for private business activity; 
and overall living environment for expatriates. 
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Wu (2006) expects cross-border FDI to decline with corruption distance (difference of 
the CPI value between the investor country and the receptor). As most OECD countries 
have lower levels of corruption than do non-OECD countries, these latter, should reduce 
their corruption levels in order to attract more FDI from OECD countries. In the same 
line of argumentation Drabek and Payne‟s (2001) empirical analysis shows that the 
degree of non-transparency is an important factor in a country's attractiveness to 
FDI. Specifically, they show that high levels of non-transparency decrease FDI inflows. 
In the same way, increasing transparency levels will have a positive effect on FDI. 
Using data from Transparency International‟s Corruption Perception Index and its first 
(1999) Bribe Payer‟s Index Sanyal and Samanta (2004) test two hypotheses: “US FDI to 
a country is likely to be affected by that country‟s level of corruption” and “US FDI is 
likely to be lower in countries where the perceived level of corruption is high”. The 
study confirms a direct correlation between CPI and BPI. Countries ranked high on the 
CPI are also high on the BPI. This study also uses Gross Domestic Product (GDP), as a 
determinant of FDI, and the final result indicates that both GDP and CPI in the host 
countries are significantly important for FDI flows (from the USA in this case). Larrain 
and Tavares (2004) controls FDI inflows, import intensity and per capita income levels, 
as well as corruption levels, measured in accordance with the International Country 
Risk Guide indicator, and find that not only the high corruption levels deter FDI, but 
also high inflows of FDI, deter corruption.  
Warren and Laufer (2010) empirical test about the effect of corruption rankings (CPI) 
on investment desirability, finds that unfavorable rankings reduce investment 
desirability, while favorable corruption rankings boost investment desirability.  
Finally, Habib and Zurawicki‟s (2001) study also supports the earlier observed negative 
effects of corruption on FDI. However, it also shows that the degree of international 
openness and the political stability of the receptor market moderate the influence of 
corruption in the FDI inflows. 
From the empirical studies summarized in Table 4, three main conclusions can be 
drawn:  
1) regardless the indicators, in isolation (Wei, 2000; Drabek and Payne, 2001; Wu, 
2006; Baughn et al., 2010), or combined with other institutional quality indicators 
 14 
(Habib and Zurawicki, 2001; Larrain and Tavares, 2004; Cleeve, 2008; Sanyal and 
Samanta, 2008; Warren and Laufer, 2010), corruption evidence always a negative 
relation with FDI;  
2) when in combination with other institutional quality indicators (Habib and 
Zurawicki, 2001; Larrain and Tavares, 2004; Cleeve, 2008; Sanyal and Samanta, 2008; 
Warren and Laufer, 2010), these latter fail to be statistically significant for explaining 
FDI inflows. The only exception is Warren and Laufer, (2010), when controlling the 
variable Country Desirability;  
3) the sample size and diversity is quite disparate preventing to assess whether the use 
of distinct indicators of corruption (in isolation or jointly with IQ indicators) would 
bring dissimilar results in terms of impact on FDI inflows.  
Table 4: Empirical studies on the impact of Corruption (C) and Institutional Quality (IQ)on FDI 
Studies Sample 
Dependent 
Var./ Proxy FDI 
Proxy IQ Proxy C 
Impact Estimation 
method IQ C 
Baughn et al. 
(2010) 
30 Leading 
Exporting 
Countries 
FDI Inflows   
Bribery Payers 
Index (BPI) 
 + 
Regression 
analyses 
Wei (2000) 
14 source 
countries 45 
host countries 
Bilateral FDI 
Inflows  
 
Business 
Internatl 
.Index(BI) 
 _ 
Linear 
Regression 
analyses 
(OLS 
estimation) 
Wu (2006) 
 (24 OECD 
source 
countries) 52  
host countries 
FDI Inflows   
Corruption 
Distance (CD) 
 _ 
Regression 
analyses 
Drabek and 
Payne (2001) 
162 Countries 
FDI Inflows 
(FDI/GDP)  
Transparency 
Index(TI-
ICRG) 
 + + 
Regression 
analyses 
Cleeve (2008) 
16 Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Countries 
FDI Inflows  
(Political 
Freedom + 
Civil 
liberty)/2 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
0 _ 
Multivariate 
Regression 
Sanyal and 
Samanta (2008) 
USA and other 
42 countries 
(inflows) 
Outward US FDI GDP 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
0 _ 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
Larrain and 
Tavares (2004) 
20 countries 
(leading 
economies) 
FDI Inflows 
(FDI/GDP)  
Degree of 
Country 
Openness  
Level of 
Corruption 
(ICRG) 
0 _ 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
Warren and 
Laufer (2010) 
12 Countries 
Country 
desirability 
(investment 
atraction) 
TI Ranking 
Corruption 
Perception Index  
(CPI) 
_ _ 
Panel Data 
(inquiries) 
Habib and 
Zurawicki 
(2001) 
111 countries FDI Inflows  POLRISK 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
CPI 
0 _ 
OLS 
Multiple 
Regression 
analyses 
Legend: (CPI) Corruption Perception Index; (TI) Transparency International; (BPI) Bribe Payer‟s Index; (HDI) Human 
Development Index; (EFI) Economic Freedom Index; (GDP) Gross Domestic Product; (ICRG) International Country Risk 
Guide indicator; (BI) Business International Index; (CD) Corruption Distance (∆ CPI ab); (POLRISK) Political 
Risk/Instability index (PRS Yearbook) 
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Chapter 2.  Corruption, institutional setting and FDI. Methodological 
considerations 
2.1.  Initial considerations 
As referred earlier, the present study aims to test whether the use of distinct proxies for 
corruption, in isolation and controlled for other institutional quality factors impacts 
differently on FDI (controlling in every case for other factors - Market, Social and 
Political - which traditionally are taken into account in the study of FDI flows). In the 
present chapter we detail the data set used, the proxies for each variable of the model, 
and the methodology used to estimate that model. Thus, in the next section (Section 
2.2), we explain the research questions and present the „theoretical model‟. In Section 
2.3 we describe the data sources used and the proxies of the variables of the model. 
2.2.  Research question and the ‘theoretical model’  
The aim of the present study is twofold: 
1) To assess, for the same set of countries (in our case, 127 countries), and controlling 
for „traditional‟ determinants of FDI, whether the use in of distinct indicators of 
corruption influence the results regarding the relation between FDI and Corruption.  
2) To assess, for the same set of countries (in our case, 127 countries), and controlling 
for „traditional‟ determinants of FDI, whether the signal of the variable corruption 
is robust when we control for other indicators of institutional quality such as 
Human Development Index (HDI), the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), the 
Business Freedom Index (BFI), and the Ease of Doing Business (EDB) 
Thus, in accordance of the literature review performed (cf. Chapter 1), our „theoretical 
models‟ are: 
kIndicatorCorruptionPoliticsSocialMarketfInflowsFDI
antserlTraditiona
;;;
'mindet'
    
IndicatorQualitynalInstitutioOtherkIndicatorCorruptionPoliticsSocialMarketfInflowsFDI
antserlTraditiona
;;;;
'mindet'
  
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Where, k= Corruption Perception Index (CPI); Bribe Payer‟s Index (BPI); Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB), which represents the distinct proxies for the „Corruption‟ 
variable. 
The „Other Institutional Quality Indicator‟ are proxied, cf. Table 3, by the Human 
Development Index (HDI), the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), the International 
Country Risk Guide indicator (ICRG), and the Business International Index (BII) 
2.3.  Variables proxies and data sources  
The data in which our work is based encompasses 127 countries with the relevant 
variables reported to the period spanning between 2000 and 2010.
6
 
Starting with our dependent variable the FDI inflows, its proxy is presented as an 
average (2007-2010) ratio of FDI net influx in GDP. The source used is the World Bank 
database. 
Passing now to the independent or explanatory variables, they are grouped into four 
major dimensions (cf. Table 5): Market factors, Social factors, Politic factors and 
Institutional Quality related factors (which includes Corruption and other Institutional 
Quality indicators). Given that the impact of the independent variables on FDI flows 
might take time, and to avoid possible mutual causality between dependent and 
independent variable, we compute all the proxies for the independent variables as an 
average for an earlier period to that of the dependent variable (2007-2010). Thus, the 
majority of independent variables are computed and averages for the period 2005-2007. 
Regarding the „Market factors‟, we have the „Market Dimension‟ whose proxies are, in 
line of the studies by Santis and Vicarelli (2000) and Blonigen (2005), the total GDP 
and the GDP per capita.
7
 Both variables are provided by the World Bank Database, and 
are measured in USD, at constant prices, constant PPPs and with reference year 2000. 
                                                 
6 Initially, our database encompassed only the 34 OECD countries reported to the period 2004-2009. 
However, the estimations of the model based on this set of countries produced weak results due to the low 
heterogeneity of the countries regarding the FDI determinants, in particular those of corruption and 
institutional quality. We decided therefore to enlarge both the set of countries considered and the period 
in analysis, this latter in order to permit to have a period gap between the dependent variable (FDI 
inflows) and the explanatory ones – the FDI inflows is computed for the most recent period (2007/2010) 
whereas the determinant variables are computed in the beginning of the period (2000/2007). 
7 GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes 
and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. It is calculated without making 
deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. 
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Following Faeth (2009) and Bitzenis et al. (2009), „Market dynamics‟ is proxied by 
GDP Growth, i.e., the annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on 
constant local currency. The variable „Geographic location‟ is proxied by dummy which 
assumes the value 1 in the case the country is located in Europe and 0 otherwise. 
„Accessibility‟ is proxied by the percentage of telephone lines (including wireless 
subscribers) per 100 people (Santis and Vicarelli, 2000). The last variable in this group 
is „Natural resources‟. This variable intends to provide information about the country‟s 
natural wealth (Hill, 2007). However, due to the lack of information we chose the proxy 
exports of fuel in total exports, used by authors such as Hill (2007), which reflects the 
country‟s exports of oil derivates or refined products in percentage of the total of 
merchandise exports. The last two proxies are provided by the World Bank database. 
The Social factors group encompasses measures of human capital, technological 
competencies, and labour cost and quality. The variable Education/Literacy is proxied, 
following Santis and Vicarelli (2000), by the Literacy Rate, which measures the 
percentage of people aged 15 and above that can read and write. The data source is the 
CIA World Fact Book. The technological competencies indicator, Business Research 
and Development (BERD) in GDP, gives us the private research and development as a 
percentage of GDP (Santis and Vicarelli, 2000), and the source is the OECD Statistics 
and the World Bank database from UNESCO Institute for Statistics. 
The variable Labour Costs is proxied by the minimum wages in PPP USD, in the 
reference year of 2007 (Faeth, 2009). The source for this data was ILO Global Wage 
Report. 
The last variable in this group or dimension of the Social factors is the Quality of the 
Work Force, whose proxy is the Labour Force with Tertiary Education, where the 
measure, in line of Faeth (2009), is the proportion of labour force that has a tertiary 
education, as a percentage of the total labour force. This information comes from the 
WD database.
8
 
 
                                                 
8 In the first attempt to estimate the model, with the OECD sample, we also used another variable that was 
the Labour Laws flexibility which the proxy is the Labour Freedom index from The Heritage Foundation, 
that measures the mobility and protection of the workers. There was no data available for a large number 
of countries in the new sample, reason why the indicator was not considered. 
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Table 5: Variables, proxies and data sources 
Determinants Variables Indicator/proxy Data source 
Dependent variable FDI inflows 
FDI/GDP (average 2007-
2010) 
 
Market 
Market Dimension 
Total GDP (average 2000-
2007) 
World Bank 
GDP per capita (average 
2005-2007) 
World Bank 
Geographic location Europe 1/ Others 0  
Accessibility 
Telephone lines per 100 
inhabitants (average 2005-
2007) 
World Bank 
Natural resources 
Exports fuel / total exports 
(average 2005-2007) 
World Bank 
Social 
Education/literacy 
Literacy ratio (average 2001-
2006) 
CIA World Fact Book 
R&D 
Business Expenditure in 
Research & Development in 
GDP(average 2005-2007) 
World Bank 
Labour costs 
Unit labour cost in 
manufacturing (index OECD 
base year 2005=100) (average 
2005-2007) 
International Labour 
Organization 
Labour laws flexibility 
Labour Freedom 
Index(average 2005-2007) 
Heritage Foundation 
Quality work force 
Labour force with secondary 
education (average 2005-
2007) 
World Bank 
Politics 
Strength of legal rights 
Strength of legal rights index 
(0=weak to 10=strong) 
(average 2005-2007) 
World Bank 
Taxes 
Taxes on income, profits and 
capital gains (% of revenue) 
(average 2005-2007) 
World Bank 
Currency (exchange 
rates) 
Dummy-variable where it 
assumes the value 1 if 
currency is the Euro (o 
otherwise) 
 
Institutional 
Quality 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception 
Index (TI) 
CPI (average 2005-2007) 
Transparency 
International 
Bribe Payer‟s Index BPI (2008) 
Transparency 
International 
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
GCB (average 2006-2009) 
Transparency 
International 
Other 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicators 
Human Development 
Index 
Human Development Index 
0/1 (average 2000-2010) 
United Nations 
Business Freedom 
Business Freedom 
Index(average 2005-2007) 
Heritage Foundation 
Ease of Doing Business 
Rank 
Doing Business (average 
2005-2007) 
World Bank 
 
Regarding the Political group of indicators we start with the fiscal burden which is 
proxied by Taxes on Income, Profits and Capital Gains, (percentage of total taxes) 
(Blonigen, 2005; Bitzenis, 2006; Faeth, 2009) and is provided by the World Bank and 
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the International Monetary Fund. The uncertainty associated to countries‟ exchange 
systems (Faeth, 2009) is proxied by the variable „Currency Risk‟, which is a dummy, 
where the “non euro” countries are classified with 0 and the euro countries have the 
value 1. Additionally, we considered the variable „Customs‟, whose proxy is Burden of 
Customs Procedure, which measures business executives' perceptions of their country's 
efficiency of customs procedures. The rating ranges from 1 to 7, with a higher score 
indicating greater efficiency. The source for this data is the Global Competiveness 
Report and data files from the World Economic Forum. 
In what respects the Institutional Quality group, and starting by the Corruption 
indicators, we included three indicators, all of them provided by the Transparency 
International organization: the Corruption Perception Index (CPI), the Bribe Payer‟s 
Index (BPI), and the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB). In the case of the two first 
indicators the value 0 corresponds to very corrupt classification, and the 10 value the 
less corrupt (very transparent). The CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of 
corruption as seen by business people and country analysts whereas the BPI reflects the 
propensity of exporting companies to pay bribes in exporting markets. As we said 
above, the score 10, represents the lowest possible propensity to pay bribes. 
In the third one, the Global Corruption Barometer (GCB), which is a composite index 
(average of other eleven indicators
9
), the classification is obtained through the answer of 
the question “To what extent do you perceive the following institutions in this country 
to be affected by corruption?”, where the value 1 is not at all corrupt, and the values 5 is 
extremely corrupt.
10
  
All these three indicators are provided by the Transparency International Organization. 
Because the BPI indicator only includes information for 43 countries, we add a new 
corruption indicator called „Bribes‟ which measures the amount of Irregular Payments 
and Bribes. This indicator represents the average score across the five components of 
the following Executive Opinion Survey question: In your country, how common is it 
                                                 
9 Political Parties; Parliament/Legislator; Police; Business/Private Sector; Media; Public Officials/Civil 
Servants; Judiciary; NGOs; Religious Bodies; Military; Education System. 
10 Due to extreme difficulties and despite the huge effort in finding information, we could not get 
information for Belgium, Estonia, Slovak Republic and Sweden for the Bribery Payers Index and for the 
Global Corruption Barometer. In order to overcome that gap, we use a proportional rule, having 
Switzerland as a reference. 
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for firms to make undocumented extra payments or bribes connected with (a) imports 
and exports; (b) public utilities; (c) annual tax payments; (d) awarding of public 
contracts and licenses; (e) obtaining favorable judicial decisions. The answer to each 
question ranges from 1 (very common) to 7 (never occurs), and the result we will 
consider is the weighted average. The source is The Global Competitiveness Report, 
from the World Economic Forum. 
In the other Institutional Quality indicators we have the Human Development Index, 
provided by the United Nations. This index measures development by combining 
indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income into a composite 
human development index. It serves as a frame of reference for both social and 
economic development and it is expressed as a value between 0 and 1.  
The Economic Freedom Index is an indicator that reflects the right of every human to 
control his own labour and property. It measure ten components
11
 of economic freedom, 
assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the 
maximum freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall 
economic freedom score for each country. Four this variable, we used the Heritage 
Foundation reports as source. 
The last variable/proxy in this group is the Business International Index. The Business 
freedom is a quantitative measure of the ability to start, operate, and close a business 
that represents the overall burden of regulation as well as the efficiency of government 
in the regulatory process(Drabek, and Payne, 2001; Bitzenis et al., 2009). It scores for 
each country is a number between 0 and 100, with 100 equalling the freest business 
environment. The score is based on 10 factors,
12
 all weighted equally, using data from 
the World Bank‟s Doing Business study. 
                                                 
11 Business, Trade, Fiscal, Monetary, Investment, Financial, Labor Freedom; Government Spending; 
Property Rights; Freedom from Corruption. 
12 Starting a Business (# procedures; # days; cost in percentage of income per capita; minimum capital 
need in percentage of income per capita); Obtaining a license (#procedures; # days; cost in percentage of 
income per capita); Closing a business (# years; cost in percentage of estate; recovery rate in cents of 
dollar). 
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Table 6: Variables, proxies and data sources (final framework) 
Determinants Variables Indicator/proxy Source 
Dependent variable FDI inflows FDI/GDP World Bank 
Market 
Economy Growth GDP growth World Bank 
Market Dimension GDP per capita World Bank 
Acessibility Telephone lines per 100 inhabitants World Bank 
Natural resources 
Fuel Exports (% merchandise 
exports) 
United Nations Statistics Division 
Social 
Education/literacy literacy rate CIA World Fact Book 
R&D 
Business Expenditure in Research & 
Development (BERD in GDP) 
UNESCO 
Labor costs Minimum Wages 
ILO (LABORSTA) Labour 
Statistics Database / Global Wage 
Report 
Quality work force 
Labor force with tertiary education 
(% total labor force) 
World Bank 
Politics 
Taxes 
Taxes on income, profits and capital 
gains WB (% of revenue) 
World Bank / IMF 
Currency (exchange 
rates) 
Dummy (Euro/other)  
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 Q
u
al
it
y
 
Corruption 
Corruption Perception 
Index 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) Transparency International 
Bribes Irregular Payments and Bribes World Economic Forum 
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
Global Corruption Barometer Transparency International 
Other Institutional 
Quality indicators 
Human Development 
Index 
Human Development Index United Nations 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
Economic Freedom Index Heritage Foundation 
Business International 
Index 
Business Freedom Heritage Foundation 
Ease Ease Doing Business Doing Business WB 
 
Finally, the variable „Ease‟, proxied by the Ease of Doing Business index, ranks the 
economies from 1 to 183. A high ranking on this index means the regulatory 
environment is more conducive to the starting and operation of a local firm. It averages 
the country's percentile rankings on 9 topics,
13
 made up of a variety of indicators, giving 
equal weight to each topic. The source used is the Doing Business organization from the 
World Bank.
14
 
                                                 
13 Starting a business, dealing with construction permits, registering property, getting credit, protecting 
investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts and closing a business. 
14 We also analysed four additional proxies in the Institutional Quality group: Protecting Investors 
Strength (index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more investor protection), and Time to 
Starting Business (in number of days) and Procedures to Starting Business (where the measure is the 
number of procedures). The source for all was the Doing Business organization from the World Bank. 
Nevertheless, give the high correlation with the overall „Ease‟ index we decided to dropped these latter 
variables. 
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2.4.  Econometric model specification   
Our „dependent‟ variable, FDI flow above the average, is a dummy which assumes the 
value 1 in the case the country has FDI flows above the average and 0 otherwise (below 
or at the average). Given the nature of the dependent variable (binary), the empirical 
assessment of FDI flow above the average „propensity‟ is based on the estimation of the 
general logistic regression, which in turn is based on the existing literature on the 
determinants of entry modes, surveyed in Chapter 1.  
In order to have a more straightforward interpretation of the logistic coefficients, it is 
convenient to consider a rearrangement of the equation for the logistic model, in which 
it is rewritten in terms of the odds of an event occurring. Writing the logistic model in 
terms of the log odds, we obtain the logit model: 
i
QualitylInstOther
QualitylInstPoliticslSocial
Market
EaseBIIBFIHDI
CorruptionCurrencyTaxesqualityLabortLaborRDEducation
resourcesnaturalityAccessibilensionMarketgrowthMarket
averagebelowatFDIob
averageaboveFDIob
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    
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Then, 
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The logistic coefficient can be interpreted as the change in the log odds associated with 
a one unit change in the independent variable. Then, e raised to the power βi is the factor 
by which the odds change when the i
th
 independent variable increases by one unit. If βi 
is positive, this factor will be greater than 1, which means that the odds are increased; if 
βi is negative, the factor will be less than one, which means that the odds are decreased. 
When βi is 0, the factor equals 1, which leaves the odds unchanged.  
In the case where the estimate of β9 emerges as negative and significant for the 
conventional levels of statistical significance (that is, 1%, 5% or 10%), this means that, 
on average, all other factors remaining constant, the FDI above the average countries 
are associated with lower levels of corruption.  
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Chapter 3.  Corruption, institutional setting and FDI. Empirical 
results 
3.1.  Initial considerations 
In this chapter we describe in detail, the results of the estimation of the econometric 
regression used to infer the influence of the different indicators of corruption and 
institutional quality, in the behaviour of FDI influxes, controlling for other traditional 
determinants of FDI. Thus, in the next section (Section 3.2), we expose the descriptive 
results, namely the estimates of the correlations between the variables and the analyses 
of differences in mean values, resulting from the non parametric test of differences in 
means of Kruskal-Wallis. In the last section (Section 3.3) we present and discuss the 
results of the estimation of the econometric regression. 
3.2.  Descriptive results 
3.2.1.  Differences in means 
In order to better know our data, we will analyze it using the Kruskal-Wallis
15
 test and 
observe the differences in means.  
Our dependent variable, is presented in a logistic form, were the FDI in GDP assumes 
only two values, above the mean and otherwise (cf. Table 7).  
As we can see in Table 7, according to the test, the only statistically significant (p-value 
<0.05) differences occurred in only two dimensions/variables, Politics/Taxes and 
Institutional Quality/Economic Freedom Index.  
In the variable Taxes (p-value =0.006), we can observe that the average total tax in the 
countries that are below the average (FDI/GDP) is about 40%. On the contrary, the 
average tax in the countries above the average (FDI/GDP) does not reach 30%. 
Considering this, we can conclude that this could be a relevant determinant in FDI 
attraction. 
                                                 
15 The non parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis is based on the null hypothesis and tests if the sample comes 
from populations with the same distribution. It serves to assess whether there is evidence of statistically 
significant differences in the mean values of the observed variables (Maroco, 2010). 
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Table 7: Differences in means (Non parametric test Kruskal Wallis) 
Determinants Variables Indicator/proxy 
Means 
Kruskal-
Wallis test 
[p-value] 
All 
Countries 
FDI_GDP 
below the 
average 
FDI_GDP 
above the 
average 
Market 
Economy 
Growth 
GDP growth 0.0577 0.0563 0.0601 0.130 
Market 
Dimension 
GDP per capita 7894.58 7610.28 8378.51 0.960 
Acessibility 
Telephone lines 
per 100 
inhabitants 
20.69434 19.4849 22.75296 0.322 
Natural 
resources 
Fuel Exports (% 
merchandise 
exports) 
0.16645 0.19311 0.12106 0.158 
Social 
Education/liter
acy 
literacy rate 0.8235 0.8026 0.8591 0.164 
R&D 
Business 
Expenditure in 
Research & 
Development 
(BERD in GDP) 
0.87242 0.92857 0.77712 0.668 
Labor costs 
Minimum 
Wages 
402.8837 416.8305 372.4074 0.836 
Quality work 
force 
Labor force with 
tertiary 
education (% 
total labor force) 
0.18484 0.19105 0.17353 0.164 
Politics 
Taxes 
Taxes on 
income, profits 
and capital gains 
WB (% of 
revenue) 
0.3622 0.4006 0.2968 0.006 
Currency 
(exchange 
rates) 
Dummy 
(Euro/other) 
0.12 0.13 0.11 0.755 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 Q
u
al
it
y
 
Corruption 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index (CPI) 
4.2072 4.0716 4.4381 0.273 
Bribes 
Irregular 
Payments and 
Bribes 
4.212 4.096 4.412 0.261 
Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
3.2828 3.2922 3.2661 0.950 
Other 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicators 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human 
Development 
Index 
219495.85 320690.46 46019.38 0.541 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
0.6 0.5857 0.6243 0.028 
Business 
International 
Index 
Business 
Freedom 
0.6348 0.6359 0.633 0.988 
Ease 
Ease Doing 
Business 
5.2953 5.0438 5.7234 0.084 
In the other relevant variable, the Economic Freedom Index (p-value =0.028), we can 
observe that the group of countries that are below the average (FDI/GDP), the value of 
this variable is 0.58. In the other group of countries, above the average (FDI/GDP), the 
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value of the variable is 0.62. With the indicator ranging between 0 and 1, were the high 
value represents the maximum freedom, according to the right of every human to 
control his own labour and property, the conclusion that countries with a higher level of 
Economic Freedom, attracts more FDI, makes sense. 
3.2.2.  Correlations between variables 
Starting with the dependent variable, we present it not only as a logistic model, were the 
FDI in GDP assumes only two values, above the mean and otherwise, but also in the 
form of logarithm. As we will use the logistic regression, we also keep the dependent 
variable in is logistic form (cf. Table 8).  
The dependent variable, measured either as a dummy (above the average or otherwise) 
or logarithm of the ratio (estimated by the traditional model of the least squares) is 
related to the market, human capital, taxes, corruption and institutional quality (cf. 
Chapter 1). 
Trough the Pearson coefficient estimates, there is a significant positive relation of the 
dependent variable (FDI/PIB) and the variables GDP growth (0.182), in the Market 
dimension, Literacy Rate (0.206) in the social dimension, Taxes (0.215) in the Politics 
dimension, and the Economic Freedom Index (0.062) in the Institutional Quality 
dimension. They are all significant at 10%, except the Economic Freedom Index, which 
is significant a 5%. This observation means that, in a bivariate perspective, and on 
average, countries with high rates of market growth, high literacy, taxes and EFI (more 
transparent) above the average, attracts more FDI. In contrast, the currency risk (-0.199) 
in the Politics dimension, and the Global Corruption Barometer (-0.272) in Institutional 
Quality dimension, reveal also a significant correlation at 5% and 10%, respectively, but 
negative, which suggests that the non euro and the less corrupt countries, on average, 
attract more FDI.   
Passing now to the independent variables, we can start saying that we will not consider 
the variables/proxies that are highly correlated ( >0.60) between each other, because it 
could signify that the variables are measuring the same factor, and multicollinearity 
problems may arise (Maroco, 2010). That is the case of the variables GDP Per Capita 
and Accessibility (Telephone Lines), reason way we will exclude them. 
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Also, in almost all proxies of corruption and Institutional Quality, with the exception of 
the Global Corruption Barometer, we can observe very high correlation levels between 
themselves. However, in this particular case, it does not constitute a problem because in 
the model they will be estimated separately.  
Another important remark is the fact that, due to the necessity to keep the number of 
observations as highest as possible, we had to calculate the matrix without tree 
variables, the R&D (BERD in GDP), the Labor Costs (minimum wages) and the Global 
Corruption Barometer. These tree variables were calculated separately and then 
included in the global correlation matrix. 
Analyzing in detail the correlations between the independent variables, and again trough 
the Pearson coefficient estimates, there is a significant negative relation between the 
„GDP Growth‟ and the „GDP per capita‟ and „Accessibility‟ (that will be excluded) and 
also with the variables „Literacy rate‟ (-0.182), „R&D‟ (-0.359), „Labor Costs‟ (-0.479), 
„Currency risk‟ (-0.296). These values are explained by extent literature, and suggests 
that, on average, high literacy rates, R&D expenditures, labor costs and non euro 
currencies, raise the risk of business and the cost of production, so, they attract less FDI. 
The other three variables, CPI (-0.331), Bribes (-0.251), and Business Freedom index (-
0.245), tells us that, on average, countries that are more transparent/less corrupts, more 
resistant‟s to bribery and more transparent, attracts more FDI. 
The proxy „fuel exports‟, for the variable „Natural Resources‟, has a significant negative 
relation with the proxies „Literacy Rate‟ (-0.200), „Labor costs‟ (-0.262), „Taxes‟ (-
0.308), „CPI‟ (-0.259), „Bribes‟ (-0.231), „EFI‟ (-0.297) and „Freedom index‟ (-0.204), 
and has a significant positive relation with the proxies „Currency risk‟ (0.188) and „Ease 
of Doing Business‟ (0.193). 
Also, the variable „Literacy‟ is significant related with other 10 variables, as well as the 
„R&D‟, the „Labor costs‟, the „Quality work force‟, the „Taxes‟ and the „currency risk‟. 
All of this variables present significant, both positive and negative correlations, between 
each other. Although some of these correlations are strong, these are not high enough to 
create any problems for the estimation of the model.
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix 
Determinants Variables Indicator/proxy Mean 1.a 1.b 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Dependent variable FDI inflows 
1.a. FDI/GDP 
(dummy) 
,3444 1 0,678*** 0,182* 0,004 0,114 -0,164 0,206*  0,059 0,069  -0,017 0,215** -0,199* 0,13 0,129 -0,272*  0,062 0,222** -0,008 -0,041 
1.b. FDI/GDP (ln) -3,3273   1 0,166 0,073 0,141 -0,246** 0,162  0,033  0,142 0,096 0,214** -0,052 0,202* 0,186*  -0,294* 0,122 0,296*** 0,111 -0,149 
Market 
Economy 
Growth 
2. GDP growth ,0548     1 -0,304*** -0,254** -0,005 -0,182*  -0,359**  -0,479*** -0,048 -0,012 -0,296*** -0,331*** -0,251**  -0,026 -0,162 -0,025 -0,245** 0,146 
Market 
Dimension 
3. GDP per capita 
(ln) 
8,2761       1 0,869*** -0,107 0,639***  0,722***  0,856*** 0,496*** 0,302*** 0,393*** 0,879*** 0,782***  -0,313** 0,889*** 0,721*** 0,814*** -0,698*** 
Accessibility 
4. Telephone lines 
per 100 ihnabitants 
(ln) 
2,8454         1 -0,113 0,761***  0,650***  0,738*** 0,516*** 0,271** 0,192* 0,722*** 0,614***  -0,225 0,902*** 0,551*** 0,666*** -0,578*** 
Natural resources 
5.Fuel Exports in 
total merchandise 
exports 
,1263           1 -0,200* -0,147   -0,262* 0,044 -0,308*** 0,188* -0,259** -0,231**  0,235 -0,151 -0,297*** -0,204* 0,193* 
Social 
Education/literac
y 
6. Literacy rate ,8886             1  0,450***  0,531*** 0,408*** 0,325*** 0,039 0,492*** 0,426***  -0,279* 0,753*** 0,429*** 0,452*** -0,452*** 
R&D 
7. Business 
Expenditure in 
Research & 
Development 
(BERD in GDP) 
,0087               1  0,603***  0,524*** 0,300*  0,380**  0,670***  0,626***   -0,205 0,639***  0,546***  0,609***  -0,566***  
Labor costs 8. Minimum Wages 5,5952                 1  0,408*** 0,193  0,403***  0,791***  0,727***   -0,323** 0,783***  0,608***  0,707***  -0,595***  
Quality work 
force 
9. Labor force with 
tertiary education 
(% total labor 
force) 
,18866                   1 0,294*** 0,197* 0,425*** 0,362***  0,064 0,528*** 0,39*** 0,462*** -0,44*** 
Politics 
Taxes 
10. Taxes on 
income, profits and 
capital gains WB 
(% of revenue) 
1,8428                     1 0,214** 0,409*** 0,349***  -0,327** 0,305*** 0,428*** 0,404*** -0,538*** 
Currency 
(exchange rates) 
11. Dummy 
(Euro/other) 
,3068                       1 0,385*** 0,379***  0,011 0,235** 0,292*** 0,349*** -0,405*** 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 Q
u
al
it
y
 
Corruption 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
12. Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
1,6834                         1 0,907***  -0,423*** 0,748*** 0,796*** 0,858*** -0,777*** 
Bribes 
13. Irregular 
Payments and 
Bribes 
1,6675                           1  -0,425*** 0,611*** 0,688*** 0,777*** -0,752*** 
Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
14. Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
1,4454                             1  -0,295* -0,338**  -0,299*  0,285*  
Other 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicators 
Human 
Development 
Index 
15. Human 
Development Index 
,5146                               1 0,676*** 0,722*** -0,623*** 
Economic 
Freedom  Index 
16. Economic 
Freedom  Index 
,4839                                 1 0,799*** -0,765*** 
Business 
International 
Index 
17. Business 
Freedom Index 
,5167                                   1 -0,866*** 
Ease 
18. Ease Doing 
Business 
3,8876                                     1 
Legend: *** (**)[*] statistically significant at 1%(5%)[10%]; grey cells means that multicollinearity problems may arise. 
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The problematic correlations are signed in grey color in the correlation matrix. The high 
correlations observed between the proxies of corruption and institutional quality, are not 
problematic because they will be used singly in each model. However, the results 
evidence the similarity between the dimensions that they are measuring.  
3.3. Econometric results 
We now estimate the models in order to answer to our research questions: 
Q1. To assess, for the same set of countries, and controlling for „traditional‟ 
determinants of FDI, whether the use of distinct indicators of corruption, such us 
Corruption Perception Index (CPI), Irregular Payments and Bribes (Bribes) and Global 
Corruption Barometer (GCB), influence the results regarding the relation between FDI 
and Corruption.  
Q2. To assess, for the same set of countries, and controlling for „traditional‟ 
determinants of FDI, whether the signal of the variable corruption is robust when we 
control for other indicators of institutional quality such as Human Development Index 
(HDI), the Economic Freedom Index (EFI), the Business Freedom Index (BFI), and the 
Ease of Doing Business (EDB) 
In order to do this, we estimate six models (cf. Table 9). The models I, III and V, for the 
three indicators of corruption, and the models II, IV and VI, for each of the variables of 
corruption but this time controlling for the other variables of institutional quality. 
According to the Hosmer and Lameshow test (p-value) and the percentage of 
observations corrected, we can conclude about the goodness of fit of the estimated 
models. When we accept the null hypothesis (p-value>0.10) of the Hosmer and 
Lameshow test then we can say that the model represents the reality well.  
In this case, we reject at 10% significance (but not at 5%) the null hypothesis for the 
first model (p-value = 0.085), concluding that the model is not very good. But for all the 
remaining models we accept the null hypothesis that they represent the reality well. 
In the first model only one variable is statistically significant (p-value<0.10), the 
variable Taxes (-4.214). In this case, on average, ceteris paribus, we can conclude that 
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the higher the taxes the lower is the FDI attraction. Being the only significant variable 
in this model, is the only one that could justify FDI. 
The model II, similar to the previous one, but including the four variables of 
institutional quality, present a better fit with several variables - literacy rate (5.948), 
taxes (-5.095), CPI (3.461), and tree of the IQ variables HDI (-11.255), EFI (29.032) 
and BF (-28.374) – being statistically significant. Specifically, on average, all the 
remaining factors being constant, there is enough statistical evidence to argue that 
countries with high quality of human capital and lower taxes tend to attract more FDI. 
Moreover, more transparent (high CPI) countries tend to present above the average FDI 
flows. It is important to highlight the fact that the proxy for corruption (CPI) turns 
significant when the Institutional Quality variables are included in the model. 
In model III and IV, the proxy for corruption is „Bribes‟. In the model III we have tree 
variables that are significant at 10%: education, taxes and bribes. So, compared to 
Model I, where we used CPI as proxy for corruption and the estimate coefficient failed 
yo be significant, in the case of „bribes‟ the estimate is significant and positive, meaning 
that, on average, all the remaining factor being constant, countries that present a lower 
level of briberies tend to attract higher FDI flows. Controlling for the institutional 
quality variables maintains these results with high levels of coefficients‟ significance. 
Summing up, distinct proxies for corruption yield distinct results concerning the impact 
that corruption potentially has on FDI. 
In the last two models (V and VI), the proxy for corruption is „Global Corruption 
Barometer‟ (GCB). Similarly to Model I, in Model V (without controlling for other 
Institutional Quality factors) the variable GCB is not significant. Moreover, when 
controlling for other Institutional Quality factors the corruption proxy continues to fail 
in being statistically significant. Beside „Natural Resources‟ and „Taxes‟, which emerge 
as significant (p-value<0.05), and negatively related to FDI, „Economic Freedom Index‟ 
(EFI) emerges as the only institutional related variable which is robust and positively 
significant at 5%, reflecting that, on average, countries which are characterized by 
higher levels of economic freedom tend to attract higher amounts of FDI.  
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Table 9: Models Logistic Estimation 
Determinants Variables Indicator/proxy Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI 
Market 
Economy Growth 2. GDP growth 7.024 4.798 7.795 3.859 4.117 -8.543 
Natural resources 
Fuel Exports in total 
merchandise exports 
-2.318 -0.466 -2.167 -.252 -12.916** -10.631* 
Social 
Education/literacy Literacy rate .818 5.948** 4.408* 11.019** 2.518 5.736 
Quality work 
force 
labor force with 
tertiary education (% 
total labor force) 
-2.327 0.093 -2.206 0.198 -2.390 -4.047 
Politics 
Taxes 
Taxes on income, 
profits and capital 
gains WB (% of 
revenue) 
-4.214* -5.095** -4.497* -5.342** -6.923** -13.036*** 
Currency 
(exchange rates) 
Dummy (Euro/other) -0.633 0.220 -0.699 0.251 -0.633 0.134 
In
st
it
u
ti
o
n
al
 Q
u
al
it
y
 
Corruption 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
Corruption 
Perception Index 
(CPI) 
1.452 3.461*         
Bribes 
Irregular Payments 
and Bribes 
    2.479* 4.536**     
Global 
Corruption 
Barometer 
Global Corruption 
Barometer 
        -2.034 1.369 
Other 
Institutional 
Quality 
indicators 
Human 
Development 
Index 
Human Development 
Index 
  -11.255**   -12.676**   -9.047 
Economic 
Freedom Index 
Economic Freedom 
Index 
  29.032***   37.658***   33.853** 
Business 
Freedom Index 
Business Freedom 
Index 
  -28.374***   -23.682**   -6.967 
Ease Doing 
Business 
Ease Doing Business   -0.203   0.259   -0.055 
  
Constant -2.132 3.491 -7.154 -17.594 3.399 -10.043 
   
N 96 96 92 92 74 74 
   
FDI/GDP above the 
average 34 34 31 31 25 25 
   
Otherwise 62 62 61 61 49 49 
  
Goodness of fit 
      
  
Hosmer and Lameshow test (p-value) 0.085 0.304 0.341 0.685 0.456 0.237 
  
% corrected 67.7 78.1 75.0 78.3 73.0 79.7 
Legend: *** (**)[*] statistically significant at 1%(5%)[10%]; grey cells are used to highlight significant estimates. 
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Conclusions 
Although there are numerous studies on the issue of corruption and institutional quality, 
the majority of the existing studies used only one single proxy for corruption and other 
institutional quality indicators, often in isolation. Moreover, the statistical tests were 
performed in general on the basis of rather small and very specific samples.  
Using a large sample of countries, receptors of FDI, we aimed to tackle two issues.  
The first issue was to evaluating the robustness of the variable corruption, when using 
different proxies. This issue was endorsed in the estimation of the models I, III and V. 
We realize that although corruption variable did not emerge statistically significant 
when we used the proxy CPI (Model I) or GCB (Model V), when we used the proxy 
Bribes (Model III), it emerged positive and significantly related to FDI flows (i.e., 
countries less prone to bribery tend, on average, to attract more FDI). So, the answer to 
our first research question is yes. 
The second issue concerned in evaluating the robustness of the proxy of corruption, 
when we introduce into/controlled for the models, variables of institutional quality (e.g., 
Human Development Index, Economic Freedom Index, Business Freedom Index, or 
Ease Doing Business). This issue was endorsed by the estimation of the models II, IV 
and VI. In the Models II and IV, both proxies for corruption, CPI and Bribes, became 
positive and significantly related to FDI flows (although in the case of GCB - Model VI 
– the estimate of the corresponding coefficient remained non significant). According to 
this result, we have reasonable evidence that the answer to our second research question 
is also positive. 
Despite the encouraging results, the present study is not absent from limitations, which 
might constitute a path for future research. Specifically, panel data estimation 
techniques might be the most adequate for testing the above mentioned research 
questions. 
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Appendix: List of countries 
Albania Ecuador Latvia Russian Federation 
Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Lebanon Rwanda 
Angola El Salvador Lesotho Saudi Arabia 
Argentina Estonia Lithuania Senegal 
Armenia Ethiopia Luxembourg Serbia 
Australia Finland Macedonia, FYR Sierra Leone 
Austria France Madagascar Singapore 
Azerbaijan Georgia Malawi Slovak Republic 
Bangladesh Germany Malaysia Slovenia 
Belarus Ghana Mali South Africa 
Belgium Greece Mexico Spain 
Benin Guatemala Moldova Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Guinea Mongolia Sweden 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Haiti Morocco Switzerland 
Botswana Honduras Mozambique Syrian Arab Republic 
Brazil Hong Kong SAR, China Nepal Tanzania 
Bulgaria Hungary Netherlands Thailand 
Burkina Faso Iceland New Zealand Togo 
Cameroon India Nicaragua Tunisia 
Canada Indonesia Niger Turkey 
Central African Republic Iran, Islamic Rep. Nigeria Uganda 
Chad Ireland Norway Ukraine 
Chile Israel Oman United Kingdom 
China Italy Pakistan United States 
Colombia Japan Panama Uruguay 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jordan Papua New Guinea Uzbekistan 
Costa Rica Kazakhstan Paraguay Venezuela, RB 
Cote d'Ivoire Kenya Peru Vietnam 
Croatia Korea, Rep. Philippines Yemen, Rep. 
Czech Republic Kuwait Poland Zambia 
Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Portugal Zimbabwe 
Dominican Republic Lao PDR Romania 
 
 
 
